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Abstract—Privacy leaks from Netflix videos/movies is well
researched. Current state-of-the-art works have been able to
obtain coarse-grained information such as the genre and the title
of videos by passive observation of encrypted traffic. However,
leakage of fine-grained information from encrypted traffic has
not been studied so far. Such information can be used to build
behavioral profiles of viewers.
On 28th December 2018, Netflix released the first mainstream
interactive movie called ‘Black Mirror: Bandersnatch’. In this
work, we use this movie as a case-study to show for the first time
that fine-grained information (i.e., choices made by users) can be
revealed from encrypted traffic. We use the state information
exchanged between the viewer’s browser and Netflix as the side-
channel. To evaluate our proposed technique, we built the first
interactive video traffic dataset of 100 viewers; which we will be
releasing. Preliminary results indicate that the choices made by
a user can be revealed 96% of the time in the worst case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Netflix released the first mainstream interactive
movie called Black Mirror: Bandersnatch. In this movie,
viewers are allowed to create their own story-line by choosing
one of the on-screen options presented to them. For instance,
the viewers are asked choice-questions such as ‘Frosties or
sugar-puffs?’, ‘visit therapist or follow Colin?’, ‘throw tea
over computer or shout at dad?’. Depending on the viewer’s
choice, the corresponding segment of the movie gets played.
Interestingly, the choices made and the path followed can
potentially reveal viewer information that ranges from benign
(e.g., their food and music preferences) to sensitive (e.g.,
their affinity to violence and political inclination). Although
this information is available to Netflix, they are bound by
legal clauses that prevent them from misusing it. Today, to
prevent this information from leaking to unauthorized parties,
Netflix uses end-to-end encryption. Recent advancements in
the domain of encrypted network traffic analysis make it
possible to infer basic information about the preferences of
Netflix viewers. For instance, prior works [1], [2] were able to
infer the title of videos watched by viewers and their preferred
genre. In this work, we raise the following research question:
‘Do interactive movies leak sensitive fine-grained information
about the viewers to passive eavesdroppers due to the choices
that they make while watching the movie?’.
Contributions. (1) We present the first traffic analysis tech-
nique for interactive videos that can leak more information
than non-interactive videos. (2) We present the first dataset
for encrypted traffic analysis of interactive videos.
II. RELATED WORK
The objectives of existing research works [1], [2], [3] have
so far been limited to discerning video content from other
Fig. 1: The streaming process of Black Mirror: Bandersnatch
traffic, identifying the titles of videos and the genre preferred
by a viewer from encrypted traffic of conventional videos.
However, the objective of our work is to see if more fine-
grained private information about a viewer can be leaked from
encrypted interactive video traffic.
Existing techniques from the literature are not suitable
for encrypted interactive video traffic analysis due to the
following fundamental reason: inter-video features cannot be
used to differentiate between segments from the same video.
For instance, prior works [1] have used bitrate as a feature
to differentiate between two video streams. However, in the
context of an interactive video, the bitrate of chunks pertaining
to each choice will be the same and hence cannot be used
to distinguish between two video segments. In this work, we
identify an intra-video side-channel and show that it holds
across various operating conditions.
III. PROPOSED TRAFFIC ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
In this section, we first describe the streaming process
of Bandersnatch. Due to the non-linearity of the script, the
streaming process is check-pointed at each choice-question
in the movie unlike conventional Netflix videos that stream
continuously. The content of Bandersnatch is divided into
several segments, each corresponding to one path segment in
the script, with each segment consisting of multiple chunks.
Figure 1 shows an example where a viewer makes the first
two choices. The first segment of the movie (i.e., Segment
0) is common for all viewers, and its chunk streaming ends
when the viewer is presented with the first choice-question
Q1. At this point, the viewer’s browser sends a JSON file
(type-1 JSON file) to the server indicating that the viewer has
encountered Q1. The viewers are then given ten seconds to
choose one out of two options. Our experiments revealed that
Netflix considers one of the choices to be the default branch
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Conditions Attribute Value
Operational
Operating System Windows, Linux, Mac
Platform Desktop, Laptop
Traffic Conditions Morning, Noon and Night
Connection Type Wired, Wireless
Browser Google-chrome, Firefox
Behavioral
Age-group < 20, 20-25,25-30, > 30
Gender Male,Female,Undisclosed
Political Alignment Liberal, Centrist, Commu-
nist, Undisclosed
State of Mind Happy, Stressed, Sad,
Undisclosed
TABLE I: Attributes of the IITM-Bandersnatch Dataset
and prefetches chunks belonging to the default segment. We
denote the default choice for question Qi as Si and the non-
default choice as Si′. If the viewer chooses Si, then the
streaming continues uninterrupted. However, if the choice Si′
is chosen, the prefetching for Si stops and a request for Si′
is sent.
In the example from Figure 1, the viewer selects the default
choice S1 for Q1. The streaming continues uninterrupted until
Q2 appears on-screen. Like before, a type-1 JSON file is
sent from the viewer’s browser to Netflix at this point. The
viewer selects the non-default option S2′ for Q2. In this case,
another JSON file (i.e., of type-2) will be sent. Although
some chunks corresponding to S2 are pre-fetched, they will
be discarded and the chunks corresponding to S2′ will be
streamed. Therefore, we can conclude that the number and
type of JSON files sent indicate the choice made by the
viewer. However, identifying the two types of JSON files from
encrypted network traffic is challenging.
Our experiments revealed that the packets carrying the
encrypted type-1 and type-2 JSON files can be distinguished
from other packets by their SSL record lengths which are
visible even from encrypted traffic. This observation was found
to be consistent across various operating systems, browsers,
devices, connection media, and network conditions. Hence, we
use ‘SSL record lengths of client packets’ as a side-channel
to infer the choices made by the viewer while watching
Bandersnatch.
IV. THE INTERACTIVE VIDEO TRAFFIC DATASET
In this section, we describe our dataset, called IITM-
Bandersnatch, that we use to evaluate the proposed traffic
analysis technique. The dataset comprises of data points of
the form {encrypted traces, ground truth choices}. To collect
each data point, we asked the viewer to watch Bandersnatch
from the beginning and note down the choices made by them.
At the same time, we collected the encrypted network traffic.
As of now, our dataset contains information corresponding to
100 viewers who volunteered for this study.
The robustness of a traffic analysis technique can only be
evaluated if the dataset has a diverse set of representative data
points. In this dataset, we account for diversity by considering
various operating conditions such as multiple Operating Sys-
tems, devices, browsers, connection type, and network condi-
tions. Table I summarizes the operating conditions considered.
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Fig. 2: SSL record length distribution for (Desktop, Firefox, Ether-
net, Ubuntu) and (Desktop, Firefox, Ethernet, Windows)
To enable behavioral sciences researchers to evaluate their
techniques, we have also collected the behavioral state of the
viewers who participated in the study.
V. RESULTS
We conducted our preliminary experiments on the encrypted
traffic captured during 10 different viewing sessions of the
movie ’Black Mirror: Bandersnatch’. In each case, the movie
was viewed by different people under different combinations
of operational and network conditions. Figure 2 shows the
distinguishability of packets carrying type-1 and type-2 JSON
files using the SSL record lengths of client-side application
packets obtained from the encrypted traffic of viewers under
two different operational conditions. This helped us to identify
the two types of JSON files with 96% accuracy and hence the
choices made by the viewers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we present a novel side-channel attack on
interactive videos. We show that the identified side-channel
holds for various operational and behavioral conditions. We
also present the IITM-Bandersnatch dataset which contains
the behavioural and operational data of 100 viewers.
Countermeasures. An easy fix for the problem would be
to either split the JSON file or to compress it so that it
becomes indistinguishable. However, there could be timing
side-channels that may still exist even after this fix.
Extending the Dataset. The set of behavioral attributes in
our dataset are limited. Extending the dataset with information
pertaining to more relevant behavioral traits is an interesting
direction.
High-level Implications. Our work is a modest attempt at
identifying the viewer choices from encrypted traffic. We reach
out to the research community to use this information for
behavioral studies.
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